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Against Global Governance in the WTO
John McGinnis and Movsesian L. Movsesian
Abstract
This essay argues that the World Trade Organization should not become a forum
for global governance in non-trade matters. It responds to those, like Professor
Andrew Guzman, who believe that the WTO’s success suggests that the organi-
zation should be transformed into a forum for “cross-issue” regulatory bargains
among member nations on issues, ranging from the environment to human rights,
that are not easily resolved in existing international fora. We show that the cur-
rent focus of the WTO - the reduction of barriers to international trade and the
resulting promotion of private contracts - does not require the organization to face
the agency problems inherent in regulatory structures. By contrast, global reg-
ulatory ”deals,” even more than domestic legislation, may serve as vehicles for
interest-group transfers. We also explain how the WTO’s rigorous enforcement
mechanism might actually inhibit cross-issue bargaining among member nations.
Substantive regulatory bargains would necessarily increase the discretion exer-
cised by WTO dispute settlement tribunals. This increased discretion would entail
a lack of predictability that could well be intolerable for WTO members, particu-
larly developing countries. We end by arguing that the WTO can best contribute to
the long-run improvement of regulatory standards by deepening its commitment
to reducing barriers that prevent trade among the nations of the world.
 Against Global Governance in the WTO 
John O. McGinnis∗ 
Mark L. Movsesian∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In “Global Governance and the WTO,” Professor 
Andrew Guzman has done an impressive job of 
articulating a vision of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) that many international lawyers share.1 In this 
vision, the WTO’s mission should be expanded beyond 
its present task of facilitating tariff reductions 
and preventing covert protectionism. Rather, the WTO 
should take on substantive authority in a wide 
variety of non-trade areas, including the 
environment, labor, human rights, and public health. 
Unlike many people who share this vision, Guzman 
                     
∗ Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law.  A.B., 
Harvard University, 1978; M.A., Oxford University, 
1980; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983. 
∗∗ Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. 
A.B., Harvard University, 1985; J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 1988. The Authors wish to thank Professor 
Guzman and the editors of the Harvard International 
Law Journal for inviting us to respond to Professor 
Guzman’s article. We are grateful for the comments of 
Ken Abbot, Robert Howse, Jide Nzelibe, and Max 
Schanzenbach, as well as those of the participants in 
faculty workshops at Northwestern and Hofstra. 
1 Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J. [PAGE #] (2004).  
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 takes the time to describe how it might best be 
accomplished. He advocates specialized WTO 
departments and periodic “Mega-Rounds” in which 
members make cross-issue regulatory bargains. Unless 
members agreed otherwise, these regulatory bargains 
would be subject to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). 
 The availability of the dispute settlement 
system is a major element of Guzman’s proposal.2 
Guzman argues that the mechanism could serve as an 
important credibility-enhancing device that would 
encourage members to make beneficial cross-issue 
bargains. While Guzman believes that members should 
be free to avoid the application of the DSU to their 
new bargains if they wish, the unavailability of the 
mechanism as an enforcement device would rob Guzman’s 
proposal of much of its force. In the absence of the 
DSU, one might as well seek out international fora 
other than the WTO for the harmonization of global 
rules.  
 As its title suggests, Guzman’s article is 
ultimately a call for world government by the WTO. In 
this necessarily brief response, we describe some of 
the more important theoretical and practical problems 
that Guzman’s proposal presents. First, in Part II, 
we address the matter of cross-issue bargaining in 
the WTO. While cross-issue bargaining can create 
gains for parties to a contract, substantive 
regulatory deals may be vehicles for “amoral” wealth 
                     
2 For discussions highlighting the importance of the 
dispute settlement system to Guzman’s proposal, see 
id. at 23 - 24, 39 – 41, 42 - 52, 62, 78 - 79, 109.  
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 transfers among interest groups.3 Unlike the present 
WTO, which works to minimize the influence of one 
particular form of interest group--protectionists--
the transformed organization would facilitate 
agreements that empower special interests.  
 In Part III, we discuss the potential of the 
dispute settlement system as a credibility-enhancing 
device. We demonstrate why the dispute settlement 
system might actually discourage cross-issue bargains 
by vesting extraordinary discretion in WTO tribunals. 
This discretion would entail an intolerable lack of 
predictability for WTO members, particularly given 
the sensitivity of the matters involved. We explain 
why developing countries would be especially chary of 
signing on to such a regime, and show how extending 
the dispute settlement system to cover a variety of 
non-trade issues might upset the sensitive dynamic in 
which exporters work to assure national compliance 
with WTO obligations.  
 Finally, in our conclusion, we briefly address 
another possible model for the future of the WTO, one 
that we have previously described at length.4 Rather 
than transform itself into a global government--a 
World Trade, Economic, Environment, Human Rights, 
Labor, and Public Health Organization--the WTO should 
stick to its limited but important role: reducing 
barriers to trade among nations. 
                     
3 Jonathan R. Macey, Transactions Costs and the 
Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An 
Application of Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 
471, 472 (1988). 
4 John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World 
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000).  
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 II. CROSS-ISSUE BARGAINING IN GUZMAN’S WTO 
 The first major element of Guzman’s proposal is 
his call for transforming the WTO into a forum for 
cross-issue negotiation. Guzman would like to change 
the WTO from an institution that focuses primarily on 
reducing national barriers to trade into one that 
facilitates national bargaining on a variety of non-
trade topics, including the environment, labor, 
public health, and human rights. Guzman envisions a 
series of specialized departments within the WTO that 
would serve as fora for “Departmental” negotiating 
rounds in designated subject matters.5 These 
departments would be staffed by experts, appointed by 
national governments but apparently with a large 
degree of autonomy, who would negotiate agreements 
and prepare new global regulations. Guzman also 
envisions periodic “Mega-Rounds” in which nations 
would make deals that transcend departmental lines,6 
for example, rounds in which some nations agree to 
lower trade restrictions in return for other nations’ 
concessions on the environment or labor.  
 The underpinnings of Guzman’s proposal lie in 
“political bargaining” theory.7 As the name suggests, 
political bargaining theory attempts to apply the 
insights of contract theory to intergovernmental 
negotiations.8 Just as private parties can increase 
their preference satisfaction by expanding the scope 
of their bargains, governments can enhance the 
                     
5 Guzman, supra note 1, at 12 - 13. 
6 Id. at 13 - 14. 
7 ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 51 (2000).  
8 Id. at 53. 
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 potential for reaching beneficial agreements by 
addressing independent issues simultaneously, a 
practice commonly known as “logrolling.”9 For example, 
because their interests are too far apart, developing 
and developed countries might not be able to reach 
independent agreements on either agricultural 
subsidies or environmental regulations. Nonetheless, 
they might be able to reach a compromise that covers 
both subjects: developed countries might forgo some 
agricultural subsidies in exchange for developing 
countries’ agreement to somewhat higher environmental 
standards. Thus, cross-issue bargaining might make 
both sides better off.10  
 Political bargaining theory has much to offer 
the discussion of international institutions. But one 
should not casually equate private contracts with 
public regulatory bargains.11 Because private 
contracts generally enhance the preferences of the 
parties, legal mechanisms that reduce transaction 
costs to such contracts are likely to be beneficial.12 
Regulatory bargains, by contrast, are not as likely 
to be efficient in terms of nations’ true 
preferences. Such bargains are much more likely to 
represent “amoral” wealth transfers among different 
groups of citizens:13 there is a considerable danger 
                     
9 See id. at 120 - 21.  
10 See David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 
12 - 13 (2002) (discussing “strategic linkage”).  
11 On the basic distinction between private and public 
bargains, see Macey, supra note 3, at 472. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. By “amoral” we mean transfers that do not have 
a plausible moral justification. Transfers from 
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 that many such bargains would represent deals by 
special interests in various nations at the public’s 
expense. Legal mechanisms that reduce transaction 
costs to such bargains thus are not as unambiguously 
beneficial. 
 The genius of the WTO lies precisely in its 
capacity to promote private, cross-border contracts 
rather than regulatory bargains that can amount to 
wealth transfers among interest groups. Three of the 
organization’s features help assure this. First, the 
WTO has a limited focus: promoting international 
agreements to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Such agreements promote private contracting and, 
according to the theory of comparative advantage, 
increase nations’ aggregate wealth.14 The WTO’s narrow 
focus thus helps assure that the international 
agreements it facilitates will be good for each 
nation’s net welfare and will not require much 
monitoring by national governments and their 
citizens. 
                                                       
consumers to some otherwise undeserving producers’ 
group would be a paradigm example. 
14 It is true that some WTO rules, like the anti-
dumping provisions, permit interference with free 
trade, but even these rules generally limit the 
interference that would exist in the organization’s 
absence. See AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994, in ANNEX 1A TO THE 
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, FINAL ACT 
EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 147. 
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  Second, as presently constructed, the WTO acts 
to mitigate one of the most characteristic domestic 
wealth transfers. The WTO constrains the ability of 
domestic interest groups to obtain protective 
tariffs–-a historical bane of democratic politics. 
Under the WTO regime, members reduce tariffs on a 
reciprocal basis. As a result, the benefits that 
exporters derive from lower tariffs abroad depend 
upon the willingness of the exporters’ own government 
to lower its tariffs with respect to foreign 
products. The reciprocity regime thus creates 
incentives for exporters to enter the domestic 
political struggle and blunt the power of the 
protectionist interest groups at home, providing 
virtual representation for the public’s interest in 
free trade.15 Under this view, the WTO is a regime 
that facilitates democratic choice within individual 
states even as it increases aggregate wealth by 
decreasing tariff barriers.16 
 Third, the WTO’s relatively light administrative 
structure limits the danger that the organization 
will become a vehicle for wealth transfers. 
Governments can easily monitor whether other nations 
comply with tariff reductions and nondiscrimination 
requirements. Exporters directly benefit from such 
provisions and thus have incentives to bring 
                     
15 See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 4, at 545 
(noting that producers who enjoy a comparative 
advantage gain new markets when foreign countries 
reduce tariffs, which creates an incentive for such 
producers to lobby for lower tariffs in their own 
countries). 
16 Id. at 546. 
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 violations to their governments’ attention. Moreover, 
enforcing tariff reductions and attendant agreements 
to remove trade restrictions does not require 
granting the WTO wide substantive discretion.17 Thus, 
special interests cannot easily use WTO mechanisms, 
such as the DSU, to obtain rents.18  
 In contrast, transforming the WTO into a forum 
for regulatory bargains could encourage the adoption 
of rules that do not facilitate private contracts and 
do not benefit nations’ citizens as a whole. For 
example, interest groups could easily take advantage 
of the substantive discretion that regulatory 
bargains would necessarily confer on WTO officials. 
Even domestic regimes typically provide substantial 
discretion to those who interpret and implement 
regulatory requirements, and “global governance” of 
the sort Guzman envisions would require more 
discretion than domestic regulation for at least two 
reasons. First, any global regulatory regime would 
have to take into account the often dramatically 
different circumstances of member states. Second, the 
consensus requirement would make reaching agreement 
on the details of a regulatory regime more difficult 
                     
17 For further elaboration on this topic, see id. at 
566 - 72. 
18 Rent is classically defined in this context as 
“that part of the payment to an owner of resources 
over and above that which those resources could 
command in any alternative use.” James M. Buchanan, 
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE 
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 3 (James M. Buchanan et al., eds. 
1980).  
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 in the WTO than in the domestic context.19 
 Guzman’s proposal would thus require substantial 
discretion to be lodged in WTO tribunals, a matter we 
discuss below.20 One should note, however, that 
drafting discretion enjoyed by “departmental” experts 
also would provide an opportunity for interest groups 
to exercise deleterious influence over the content of 
global regulations. Interest groups have 
substantially more power at the global than at the 
domestic level. Average citizens find the 
international process even more opaque than domestic 
lawmaking and thus would have more difficulty 
monitoring those charged with fashioning global 
                     
19 The consensus requirement would also make it 
difficult for members to “overrule” an Appellate Body 
decision, a fact that Guzman acknowledges. See 
Guzman, supra note 1, at 104. 
20 Guzman expressly disavows a commission model in 
which WTO bureaucrats would have authority to 
implement the new regulations. See id. at 90 - 91. As 
a result, he argues, his proposal avoids the danger 
of interest-group capture. While the absence of a 
commission surely reduces the danger of interest 
group capture, it does not do all that much to 
eliminate it. As we explain below, Guzman’s proposal 
necessarily entails substantial discretion on the 
part of WTO tribunals. If these tribunals exercise 
large substantive discretion--for instance, to 
formulate a precise balance between environment and 
trade--interest groups would likely exert power 
through their governments on appointments to the 
tribunals. For more on the problem of discretion in 
the dispute settlement process, see infra at 19 – 20. 
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 regulatory policy.21 Moreover, the global scale of 
regulation allows greater rents for interest groups. 
If business groups could obtain international 
intervention in their favor, they could disable a 
world’s worth of competitors.22  
 In addition, departmental staffers themselves 
may have interests that diverge from the interests of 
their appointing authorities.23 Given the technical 
and esoteric nature of much of their work, staffers 
may eventually constitute a distinctive class with a 
distinctive interest--growing the regulatory 
apparatus of the WTO--that does not reflect the goals 
of domestic governments, let alone the general 
public.24 Moreover, because developing countries have 
relatively fewer personnel and resources to devote to 
the project, departmental staff from the developed 
                     
21 See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and 
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 
17 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 681, 699 - 702 (1996 - 97) 
(explaining that citizens face higher costs 
monitoring international rules than domestic rules).   
22 Cf. Frank Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s 
Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1337 - 38 (1994). 
23 See Jose E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 150 (2002) (“Trade insiders, like 
other bureaucratic agents, may develop their own 
agendas at the expense of the state principals that 
most of them serve.”).  
24 For discussion of the rise of a network of 
international regulators, see Anne Marie Slaughter, 
The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. - 
Oct. 1997, at 183, 189. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art14
 world are likely to exercise disproportionate 
influence, a disparity that will only exacerbate the 
distrust that developing countries already feel 
toward the WTO, a matter we discuss further below. 
 Guzman responds to these concerns by noting that 
national governments, which would have the ultimate 
decision about entering into any new global 
regulatory agreements, remain accountable to their 
citizens, and by stressing the unanimity requirement 
for action in the WTO.25 Neither of these responses is 
entirely persuasive. National governments themselves 
operate under the influence of interest groups and 
might well enter into global deals that help those 
interests at the expense of the general public. 
Again, because these global deals would arise in 
remote alien fora, citizens would have less ability 
to monitor them. Guzman’s proposal thus would turn 
the WTO from a Madisonian organization that checks 
the power of protectionist groups into one that 
empowers such groups at a global level. 
 The consensus requirement tempers this danger 
but would not prevent it; every nation has 
protectionist groups to pay off and regulatory 
bargaining would permit the logrolling of their 
disparate interests within the WTO. Moreover, the 
unanimity rule may create regulatory lock-in 
problems--once made, the regulations would be quite 
difficult to change.26 The consensus requirement would 
thus exacerbate a difficulty that exists in all 
                     
25 Guzman, supra note 1, at 81 - 82. 
26 See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of 
International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 549, 552 (2003) (discussing lock-in problems).  
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 international harmonized regulatory regimes: the 
stifling of jurisdictional competition that leads to 
regulatory innovation demanded by the fast-paced 
modern world. 
 Thus, given the large agency costs and other 
problems of international regulation, we believe that 
the WTO should not be a forum for the substantive 
regulatory bargains that Guzman envisions. This is 
not to say that international regulatory regimes 
never would be appropriate--they may be, in limited 
circumstances involving spillovers--only that Guzman 
has not shown that the WTO is a promising venue for 
their negotiation.27 It would be difficult for the WTO 
to set up constitutive rules that would limit its 
jurisdiction to the relatively small set of 
international regulations that make sense.28 
Particularly given the practical problems of 
                     
27 We do think that the scope for international 
regulation is far less than Guzman seems to believe. 
Because of interest group influence and the reduction 
of regulatory competition, international regulation 
to resolve externalities may cause more welfare 
losses than gains. See John O. McGinnis, The 
Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. 
INT’L. L.J. 381, 394 - 95 (2000). 
28 Domestic regimes create constitutional mechanisms 
such as the enumeration of limited powers, separation 
of powers, and bicameralism to limit the danger of 
amoral wealth transfers. See Macey, supra note 3, at 
494 - 95. The international system lacks these 
reticulated governance mechanisms and institutions, 
like our Supreme Court, with the legitimacy to 
enforce them.  
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 formulating global regulations and the dangers they 
would pose to the DSU, which we discuss below, we do 
not believe that Guzman has shown that it is best to 
undertake international regulation in the WTO rather 
than in some other context.  
 Guzman argues that his model follows on the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), which already 
represents an expansion of the WTO into substantive, 
non-trade regulation.29 But, as economists have 
argued, substantive intellectual property protections 
may be more suitable for inclusion in the WTO than 
other standards because a variety of factors, most 
particularly their very close connection to trade and 
their amenability to dispute resolution, distinguish 
them from other substantive regulations.30 Moreover, 
                     
29 Guzman, supra note 1, at 14. Guzman also argues 
that the WTO has “substantive rules on . . . health 
and safety, environmental regulation, and more,” id. 
at 110, but does not specify the content of such 
substantive rules. We have argued previously, to the 
contrary, that the WTO generally permits nation 
states to choose their own substantive regulations 
subject only to certain procedure-oriented tests that 
attempt to ferret out protectionist regulations. 
McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 4, at 573 - 83. 
30 See Keith E. Maskus, Regulatory Standards in the 
WTO: Comparing Intellectual Property Rights with 
Competition Policy, Environmental Protection, and 
Core Labor Standards (Jan. 2000), Institute for 
International Economics, available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/2000/00-1.htm 
(last visited May 1, 2004). Maskus argues that 
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 the TRIPs Agreement fits within the tradition of 
protecting the property of aliens against 
expropriation, a venerable rule of international 
law.31 Finally, even in domestic regimes like our own, 
there is a tradition of protecting intellectual 
property from the center while leaving other 
regulations to subsidiary institutions.32 This 
historical practice suggests that the balance between 
the need for centralized regulation and the danger of 
amoral wealth transfers is different with respect to 
intellectual property than with respect to other 
substantive regulation.  
                                                       
competition standards may be another candidate for 
inclusion in the WTO, but these issues could be 
addressed through antidiscrimination rules that would 
simply deepen the national treatment principle that 
is already part of the WTO regime. See McGinnis, 
supra note 26, at 581 - 85. 
31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712(1) 
(1987) (generally requiring compensation for the 
expropriation of intellectual property). See also 
Jerome H. Reichmann, Enforcing the Enforcement 
Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 
335, 356 (1997) (suggesting the TRIPs Agreement is an 
extension of this principle). 
32 The U.S. Constitution not only granted the federal 
government authority to remove trade barriers through 
the Commerce Clause but also to harmonize 
intellectual property rights. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 8, cl. 8. In contrast, before the New Deal, the 
U.S. Constitution was not interpreted to grant the 
federal government general authority over health, 
safety, or labor regulations. 
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  As a practical matter, too, the TRIPs Agreement 
stands apart from other attempts to expand the WTO 
into substantive regulation. Further progress in the 
trade regime could not have been made if exporters of 
intellectual property knew their property would be 
taken upon export; these exporters would have had no 
interest in having tariffs reduced abroad if their 
goods could simply be pirated.33 Yet intellectual 
property exporters were key in battling against 
protectionist groups, such as textile producers, in 
the developed world. The TRIPs Agreement was thus 
central to the “grand bargain” of the Uruguay Round 
that made the WTO possible.34 In contrast, members of 
the WTO today seem reluctant to add new subject 
matters to the organization.35 
 Finally, we should say a word about Guzman’s 
proposed departmental structure. Guzman believes that 
separate subject-matter departments--departments of 
environment, labor, and the like--would facilitate 
Mega-Rounds by elucidating issues and resolving 
certain topics ahead of time.36 The advantages, 
however, would likely be fewer than Guzman imagines. 
Whatever agreements the parties reach about 
substantive standards in Departmental Rounds, the 
                     
33 See John H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPS: 
International Trade in Information-Intensive 
Products, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 473, 484 (2001). 
34 See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: 
Transcending “Trade and . . .”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 
78 - 79 (2002) (discussing this “grand bargain”). 
35 We discuss this matter infra at note 60 and 
accompanying text. 
36 Guzman, supra note 1, at 20 - 23.  
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 critical point would still occur in the Mega-Rounds, 
during which parties would have to decide how to 
balance trade and other concerns. Because, by 
definition, the Departmental Rounds would not have 
authority to consider such cross-issue balancing, 
they could do little to assist this ultimate endeavor 
or to determine which precise cross-issue bargains 
would be added to the agenda of any particular Mega-
Round. 
 Moreover, departmental staffers would likely 
seek to aggrandize their positions by influencing 
negotiations in other departments.37 Guzman recognizes 
this concern, but argues that the boundaries among 
departments would be “self-enforcing”38 because member 
states would be in a position to mediate 
jurisdictional conflicts. As we have explained, 
however, given the high costs of monitoring, staffers 
will likely have a large degree of day-to-day 
autonomy from national governments and interests that 
diverge from those of their appointing authorities. 
Controlling staffers’ activities thus would be a 
burdensome task, especially for developing countries 
that lack resources to devote to the project. 
III. THE LIMITS OF THE DSU AS A CREDIBILITY-ENHANCING DEVICE 
 Unless they agree otherwise, the members’ new 
regulatory agreements would be subject to the DSU.39 
                     
37 Guzman envisions at least informal contacts among 
experts in different WTO departments. See id. at 65 - 
66.  
38 Id. at 21 n.43.  
39 Id. at 23 - 24.  
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 Guzman believes that the dispute settlement system 
can serve as a credibility-enhancing device for 
members’ regulatory commitments. The availability of 
a rigorous third-party enforcement mechanism would 
enhance members’ confidence in the durability of 
their regulatory bargains, thus increasing members’ 
“ability  . . .  to make welfare-increasing deals.”40 
The prospect of losing the many advantages of these 
deals would discourage members from leaving the new 
organization in response to adverse rulings by panels 
or the Appellate Body.41  
 The idea that third-party enforcement can induce 
beneficial bargaining is an important part of the 
contracts literature.42 Unfortunately, significant 
obstacles stand in the way of applying this insight 
to an expanded WTO. Indeed, given the enlarged 
substantive jurisdiction that Guzman envisions, one 
would expect a strong enforcement mechanism actually 
to inhibit bargaining among member states.  
 To see why this is so, recall that nations have 
widely divergent policy preferences on regulatory 
matters because of their differing political, 
cultural, and economic backgrounds. To take account 
of these differences under Guzman’s model, nations 
would have two choices. They could either hammer out 
detailed agreements that reconcile their varying 
demands, or they could draft broad agreements that 
leave substantial discretion to later adjudicators. 
                     
40 Id. at 41.  
41 See id. at 56 - 59.  
42 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L.J. 541, 562, 568 (2003).  
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 Because negotiating detailed agreements on these 
sensitive matters would entail substantial 
transactions costs, particularly given the WTO’s 
unanimity rule, nations would not favor that option.43 
 But the second option, the one that Guzman 
apparently endorses, would likely make members 
uncomfortable as well. Third-party dispute settlement 
can enhance the credibility of parties’ commitments 
only where the parties trust the adjudicative 
process.44 In the WTO context, members must have 
confidence that WTO tribunals will objectively assess 
the facts of members’ disputes and enforce members’ 
bargains as written, without adding to members’ 
obligations or adopting expansive or idiosyncratic 
interpretations. Otherwise, the “effectiveness” of 
the process itself will be an obstacle to reaching 
                     
43 One could also explain this point using the concept 
of bounded rationality. Reconciling the competing 
circumstances and demands of member nations in the 
context of cross-issue bargaining would be an 
extraordinarily complex endeavor. As a result, the 
negotiators would likely adopt cognitive shortcuts, 
such as vague standards that leave substantial 
substantive discretion in later adjudicators. See 
Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1331, 1342 (2003) (explaining how lawmakers’ 
bounded rationality might lead them to prefer 
standards to bright-line rules).  
44 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 42, at 562 
(explaining how lack of “enforcement rules and honest 
courts” in certain countries weakens the credibility 
of promises that local parties make to outside 
investors).  
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agreement, as members rationally would avoid binding 
themselves ex ante to a coercive mechanism that 
threatens to produce biased or unpredictable results. 
 The difficulty with Guzman’s proposal is that it 
necessarily would confer extraordinary discretion on 
WTO tribunals that would undermine the predictability 
of the dispute settlement process. As we have 
explained, the agreements that the tribunals would be 
called to interpret are likely to be broadly worded 
documents that provide substantial room for 
interpretive judgment. As Guzman himself recognizes, 
gaps and new issues would be inevitable.45 Since one 
of Guzman’s objectives is to reconcile trade with 
other values, such gaps will almost surely give the 
tribunals discretion to engage in relatively open-
ended balancing among objectives.46 Members could 
never be certain that the bargains would be 
interpreted as they expect. Indeed, members could 
easily conclude that the risk of unpredictable and 
unfavorable exercises of discretion by WTO tribunals 
would outweigh the benefits of the new agreements. 
                     
45 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 104.  
46 By increasing the range of possible positions in a 
dispute, such open-ended, cross-issue balancing might 
also complicate the problem of vote “cycling” in the 
Appellate Body. For more on how vote cycling in 
multi-member appellate tribunals can lead to unstable 
decisions, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of 
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 815 - 17 
(1982); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory 
Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 172 - 74 
(2001). 
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 Developing countries would be particularly chary 
of signing on to such a regime. These countries, 
which often have views at odds with Western notions 
of environmental and labor protections, already 
harbor suspicions about pro-Western bias in the WTO.47 
Granting WTO bureaucrats greater discretion would 
only exacerbate the problem. Developing countries 
could easily foresee the danger that, over time, WTO 
tribunals would transform broad treaty language about 
the environment or labor into detailed requirements 
backed up by the threat of retaliation. Moreover, 
because developing countries often lack the 
litigating resources that developed countries enjoy, 
they may rationally fear an inability to present 
their case successfully. 
 Thus, the prospect of an “effective” dispute 
settlement system may actually retard, rather than 
encourage, cross-issue bargaining by member states. 
Moreover, expansion may undermine the legitimacy of 
the dispute resolution process. WTO tribunals would 
necessarily rule on the proper balance between the 
competing demands of trade and important non-trade 
values like public health and human rights. Because 
the WTO lacks the ties of history, culture, and, most 
importantly, democratic accountability that tend to 
support domestic governments, local populations are 
unlikely to see WTO rulings on such sensitive matters 
as legitimate.48 Thus, rather than promote members’ 
                     
47 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of 
Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 126, 128 (2002). 
48 See Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and 
the World Trade Organization: Lessons From the 
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McGinnis & Movsesian (ILJ)  05/12/04 8:24 AM Page 21 
 
 
compliance with the new global regulatory regime, WTO 
rulings on substantive questions could actually 
encourage a nationalist backlash that makes such 
compliance less likely.  
 Guzman addresses some of these concerns, but the 
solutions he advocates are unpersuasive. For example, 
Guzman recognizes that requiring members to subject 
their new agreements to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system may inhibit bargaining.49 He argues, therefore, 
that the mechanism should operate only as a default 
rule: members should be free to exclude the 
application of the dispute procedures to new 
agreements.50 But this solution robs Guzman’s proposal 
of much of its force. If the WTO’s “effective” 
dispute settlement system were not available to 
enforce the new regulatory bargains, harnessing the 
organization as a forum for cross-issue negotiations 
would lack one of its salient rationales. Nations 
could always find some other supranational 
institution, like the United Nations, to host their 
discussions. Moreover, as Guzman himself notes, 
without dispute resolution and the prospect of 
sanctions it authorizes, nations may have little 
incentive to comply with parts of the cross-issue 
agreements they find burdensome. As we observe below, 
nations often do not comply with agreements they sign 
on human rights and other issues. The dispute 
settlement system thus presents something of a 
                                                       
History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
775, 816 - 17 (1999). 
49 Guzman, supra note 1, at 49.  
50 Id. at 50.  
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dilemma for Guzman. Subjecting the new agreements to 
the DSU may inhibit bargaining, but allowing nations 
to opt out of WTO enforcement greatly undermines 
Guzman’s argument for turning to the WTO in the first 
place.  
 Guzman also addresses the danger of excessive 
discretion on the part of WTO adjudicators. For 
example, he recognizes that, as trade experts, 
panelists and Appellate Body members may display a 
systematic bias in favor of trade as opposed to other 
values. In resolving disputes under a new trade-and-
environment treaty, for example, the adjudicators 
might routinely slight the environmental values that 
the treaty tried to advance. To address this problem, 
Guzman argues that the pool of potential adjudicators 
should include experts “in all relevant fields.”51 
Indeed, “the best panelists would probably have 
knowledge of more than one” substantive area.52 
 In response to the claim that excessive 
discretion would render WTO rulings less 
democratically legitimate, Guzman advocates a kind of 
judicial restraint. He argues that WTO adjudicators, 
who are less accountable than their domestic 
counterparts, should avoid using the dispute 
settlement process as a vehicle for free-form 
                     
51 Id. at 75 - 76. 
52 Id. at 76. Guzman recognizes that not every 
individual panelist can be expected to have such 
breadth of knowledge: his focus is on the expertise 
of the pool of panelists as a whole.  See id. at 76 
n.126. 
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policymaking.53 They should stick to interpreting WTO 
agreements and resist the temptation to supplement 
those instruments with the requirements of other 
treaties or customary international law.   
 Once again, Guzman’s proposed solutions seem 
unpersuasive and somewhat in tension with one 
another. While broadening the range of panelists’ 
expertise might ameliorate pro-trade bias, it would 
do nothing to make WTO dispute resolution more 
predictable. Indeed, stocking WTO panels with policy 
mavens would, in all likelihood, render dispute 
resolution less faithful to the parties’ original 
bargains. The more that panelists were chosen for 
their substantive expertise, rather than their 
proficiency in trade law, the more likely they would 
be to act as beneficent guardians, imposing their own 
visions of the “best” balance between trade and non-
trade values, rather than as humble interpreters of 
legal documents.  
 Thus, Guzman’s call for an increased diversity 
of substantive expertise on the part of panelists is 
at odds with his laudable concern for judicial 
restraint. Moreover, given the technological gap 
between the developed and the developing world, the 
experts Guzman envisions likely would come 
disproportionately from the West: they would have 
Western educations, Western credentials, and Western 
notions about the linkages between trade and other 
values. The predominance of such experts among the 
pool of panelists would only increase the unease 
developing countries would feel about their prospects 
                     
53 See id. at 95 - 96.  
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for a sympathetic hearing. 
 An additional argument militates against 
expanding the coverage of the dispute settlement 
system. One important reason why the WTO’s dispute 
settlement process has been so successful is its 
capacity to enlist the efforts of exporters in an 
offending country. Once the Dispute Settlement Body 
has ruled that a member’s law violates WTO 
requirements, the complaining country may retaliate 
by raising tariffs on that member’s exports. The 
threat of retaliation creates incentives for 
exporters in the target country to lobby for the 
removal of the WTO-inconsistent measure.54 
 Applying the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures 
to a large variety of non-trade subjects might 
compromise this dynamic. Exporters could find 
themselves the targets in a multitude of matters that 
would seem quite tangential to their concerns. They 
might suffer WTO-sanctioned retaliation because of 
their government’s anti-pollution policies, minimum-
wage laws, or rules about capital punishment. If 
exporters came to feel that the WTO was imposing 
burdens on their products in order to advance an 
expanding list of non-trade values, they might well 
reduce their efforts to lobby for the maintenance of 
the WTO regime. The regime as a whole would no longer 
be as beneficial to them as it was before.55  
 Finally, even if all these problems could be 
                     
54 See Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: 
An Interest Group Analysis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 10 
(2003).  
55 See McGinnis, supra note 26, at 589.  
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surmounted, the capacity of the dispute settlement 
system to deal with sensitive matters like the 
environment and labor remains doubtful. Enforcement 
of WTO obligations in the dispute settlement system 
depends on the ability and willingness of members to 
identify violations and bring complaints against 
nations that violate their commitments. But members 
would find it much more difficult to monitor whether 
other members were complying with substantive 
regulatory standards than whether other members were 
honoring tariff reductions and nondiscrimination 
principles. Moreover, even if members know of 
violations by others, members may lack appropriate 
incentives to bring actions. After all, nations 
rarely attempt seriously to enforce, through 
sanctions or otherwise, other nations’ compliance 
with existing human rights and labor standards.56 It 
is unclear why amalgamating such issues into the WTO 
would provide more appropriate incentives for 
action.57 And of course, if members choose to avoid 
enforcement of their new obligations through the DSU, 
as Guzman believes they should be free to do, the 
advantages of placing the new agreements in the WTO 
                     
56 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1940 
(2002) (noting that noncompliance with obligations of 
human rights treaties “appears to be common”). 
57 Insofar as nations have new kinds of incentives, 
they will often come predominantly from industries 
that will be directly advantaged by trade sanctions, 
thus confirming that expansion of the WTO may retard 
its core purpose of removing trade barriers. 
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would be greatly diminished.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Guzman appears to believe that the only 
alternative to his proposal is stagnation at the WTO. 
We have another model for progress that we have 
outlined in more detail elsewhere.58 Instead of adding 
new regulatory issues that are not closely connected 
to trade, the objective of the WTO should be to 
broaden the scope of tariff reductions and non-
discrimination rules that facilitate private 
transactions around the globe. This approach would 
permit nation-states to be the major fora for the 
expression of non-trade values. So long as they honor 
tariff reductions and do not discriminate against 
foreign goods and services, nations could set their 
own policies for their own jurisdictions.59 This would 
be a better way to inject non-trade values into 
political governance.  
  The Doha Round is largely following our 
prescription by focusing on broadening the range of 
goods and services to which free trade principles 
apply. Tellingly, negotiators are in the process of 
jettisoning the notion of binding regulations on the 
most controversial non-trade subjects (some of the 
so-called “Singapore issues”), such as competition 
                     
58 McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 4.  
59 For the reasons that the WTO appropriately does not 
countenance imposition of such policies 
extraterritorially, see McGinnis & Movsesian, supra 
note 4, at 583 - 88. 
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rules, on which a few members, primarily European 
nations, were insisting.60 Even without such subjects, 
much scope for bargaining for the reduction of 
barriers to private contracts remains. The United 
States and other developed nations can eliminate 
industrial tariffs and agricultural subsidies in 
return for developing nations’ agreement to open up 
markets in services and to cut tariffs on goods with 
respect to which developed nations have a comparative 
advantage. WTO members can continue to refine 
prohibitions against discriminatory treatment that 
blocks imports, providing WTO tribunals with the 
elements of a procedure-oriented jurisprudence that 
limits substantive discretion. The economic growth 
created by expanded trade would provide WTO members 
with more resources to address social problems 
according to their own values; members would remain 
free to collaborate on the relatively few issues 
where spillovers could be addressed successfully. 
This program represents a surer--if more indirect and 
incremental--path, not only to economic prosperity, 
but to improvements in the environment, labor, public 
health, and human rights around the world. 
                     
60 See European Trade Chief Calls for Global Framework 
by May, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 26, 2004, available at 
2004 WL 71449914 (suggesting that nations would not 
have to abide by rules on competition or investment 
as part of the next global trade deal). 
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